Remarks by Session Chair Amb. H.K. Singh

I. Economic Architecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN-led</th>
<th>US-led</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN Community 2015</td>
<td>TPP - Now 11 countries:</td>
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<td>ASEAN +1 FTAs</td>
<td>- Goods and Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>China-Korea-Japan FTA</td>
<td>plus IPRs, labour standards,</td>
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<td>APT-EAFTA/CEPEA</td>
<td>environmental standards,</td>
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<td>RCEP (CJK 12 May Summit confirmed</td>
<td>government procurement etc.</td>
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<td>RCEP as regional framework)</td>
<td>Leading to APEC-FTAAP</td>
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<td>- Region-wide market</td>
<td>Non-trade issues:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional production networks expansion</td>
<td>China, India, Indonesia and Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Region-wide infrastructure development</td>
<td>unlikely to join</td>
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Q1: Parallel and complementary or competitive models?
Q2: China-Korea-Japan Trilateral and APT process: largely supportive of ASEAN-centred integration

II. Security Architecture

North East Asia (6 Party Talks) vs. EAS (ASEAN + 8)
- Different political systems
- Different security affiliations
- Unsettled historical legacies and territorial disputes
- China’s military rise
- North Korea: China’s buffer, 38th parallel
- Challenges for US-Korea and US-Japan alliances
- Rising Chinese power will create further complexities

Conclusion: Northeast Asian regionalism is unlikely to compete against ASEAN-led structures like EAS, ARF, ADMM+

III. India-Japan-Korea Trilateral Prospects

- Free market democracies
- Complementary economies, growth potential, reducing over-exposure to China
- Bilateral CEPAs
- ASEAN-led economic integration model
- Marginalising North Korea’s proliferation and destabilization activities
- Similar approaches on China’s rise/engage but hedge against overly assertive and hegemonic China
- Continued dependence on US for security (Japan, Korea)
- Japan-Korea: despite differences, more likely to converge over long run
- Supportive of US “rebalancing” towards Asia (India, Japan, Korea)

IV. Convergences

- ASEAN-led CEPEA/RCEP
- EAS as security forum
- Shared maritime security interests
- Prospects for defence industrial cooperation
- Stabilising influence on region
- Increasing contributions to Asian security from Western Pacific to IOR
- Upgrade to Track I Trilateral